

White Paper:
Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.1
“Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components”



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Executive Summary

This paper examines the evolution of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.1, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.” Although the first iteration of the Directive was not issued until 1954, the document can trace its origins to the early 20th century.

The *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, created in 1927 and later revised in 1935, was a non-binding agreement that spelled out the “general” and “secondary” functions of each Service. The document’s inadequacies and the need for defense reform evidenced during World War II led to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the signing of Executive Order 9877 by President Harry S. Truman in the same year. These concurrently enacted documents caused conflict between the Military Services, necessitating further guidance to resolve their differences. The Key West and Newport Agreements, along with amendments to the National Security Act passed in 1949, helped drive the Defense organization forward and formed the backbone of the first iteration of DoDD 5100.1.

Significant defense reform was undertaken during the 1950s beginning with the 1953 Defense Reorganization Plan No. 6, which was then directly translated into the first iteration of DoDD 5100.1 the following year. While minor changes were made to the Directive in 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower oversaw a major defense overhaul in 1958 that led to some of the most substantial changes ever made to the document. These changes empowered Combatant Commanders at the expense of the individual Military Services.

For several decades, the Directive continued to undergo modest and often insignificant changes, including revisions in 1966, 1969, 1977, 1980, 1985, and 1986. However, in 1987, DoDD 5100.1 underwent a significant transformation as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, passed the previous year. This legislation fundamentally changed the way the Department of Defense was organized and how the Military Services operated. A second, more modest revision reflecting additional legislative changes was also produced in 1987. The latest iteration of the Directive was released in 2002 and also included only minor changes.

Significant revisions to DoDD 5100.1 have all coincided with the support of senior defense leadership and generally with the passage of legislation. No major defense overhaul has ever taken place without the guidance and support of the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Additionally, no considerable revisions to the Directive have been made during periods of major combat operations although major conflicts have often been the impetus behind reform.

This paper takes a chronological look at the history of DoDD 5100.1 (*see Timeline on p. 32*), reviews its modifications, and identifies the factors leading to each change. It identifies key leaders who spearheaded the reforms and discusses legislation that led to noteworthy revisions of the Directive. Finally, this paper will conclude with a discussion about proposed revisions to the document and observations about the necessary conditions for reform.

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Introduction

Since the country's beginnings, the roles, missions, and functions of the Armed Forces of the United States have been the subject of much debate and disagreement. Shortly before the close of the American Revolutionary War, General George Washington penned "Sentiments on the Military Peace Establishment," which outlined his ideas for the post-war military structure, roles, missions, and functions. The military's roles, missions, and functions remained relatively unchanged from those early days of the new nation until the advent of aviation and the experience of two World Wars. Indeed, upon observing the American military establishment at the start of World War II, a British general wrote back to London, "The whole organization belongs to the days of George Washington."¹ By war's end, however, military and political leadership had change in mind.

This paper will track the evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components" (DoDD 5100.1). It will review modifications made to the Directive, describe the events and factors that led to each modification, and identify the individuals who helped bring about each revision. Since U.S. military roles and missions naturally feed into, and often dictate, the functions described in the Directive, this paper will also include a discussion of roles and missions as they changed over time. The paper will note overarching trends and draw conclusions about the conditions necessary for changes to DoDD 5100.1 to occur.

DoDD 5100.1 serves as a comprehensive framework outlining roles, missions, and functions of the Department of Defense, notably the Military Services, that have been mandated by Congress through legislation, directed by the President in Executive Orders, and promoted by the Secretary of Defense and agreed upon by the Military Departments. The terms **roles**, **missions**, and **functions** are often used interchangeably, however, the terms have distinct meanings. In order to understand the

significance of the changes discussed in this paper, a clear definition of each term is necessary.

The 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) Report defines roles as "the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and U.S. Special Operations Command were established by law."² For example, according to Title 10, U.S. Code, the Air Force is, "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for *prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations.*" (*Emphasis added*). The DoD Dictionary defines missions, in this context, as, "the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore."³

Further, the QRM Report indicates that missions are executive-directed "military activities required to achieve strategic objectives."⁴ Somewhat less satisfactorily, the QRM and DoD Dictionary define functions as, "the appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization."⁵ Similarly, functions, according to U.S. Code (5 United States Code 171n (a)), include "functions, powers, and duties." While not included in either definition, activities and capabilities are also important aspects of functions. Department of Defense Directives, including DoDD 5100.1, aggregate the specific functions of the Military Services and other DoD major components. Of the three—roles, missions, and functions—the latter is the most commonly added, amended, or reassigned among DoD components.⁶

This paper is organized chronologically and will describe events leading up to major changes in the Directive, the debates over modifications, and the key players involved. The paper will also outline the changes made to each revision and the impact of each change on the document. Additionally, as there were many revisions made to the document that had a minimal impact, the paper will simply note, but not go into great detail, over these modifications. Finally, the paper will include a discussion about proposed revisions to the Directive and describe how these changes would modify the existing document.

Background

The modern version of DoDD 5100.1 originated in the aftermath of World War II with the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 9877, with President Truman leading the charge to reorganize the military under a single executive department. The primary objectives of reorganization were to better coordinate the Military Services and to further delineate their individual responsibilities. However, efforts to define distinct roles of the Army and Navy, and guide their joint operation, began at the turn of the 20th century.

The Joint Army and Navy Board

The Joint Army and Navy Board, created in 1903, was the first inter-Service body formed to institutionalize coordination between the Army and the Navy.⁷ The Spanish-American War revealed a lack of cooperation between the Military Services and a rivalry that led to confusion and conflict.⁸ This was demonstrated during the siege of Santiago when the Navy virtually abandoned the Army, after which the Army seized Spanish vessels, a move the Navy protested.⁹ Following public criticism of the military's handling of the war, the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, as well as their chief planners, formed the Joint Board in an effort to improve joint cooperation and avert the kind of disagreements that had hindered joint action during the war. Because the Joint Board had no formal authority or legislative mandate, its impact was negligible.

The performance of the U.S. military in World War I demonstrated the minimal influence the Joint Board had over influencing cooperation between the Military Services, as the body had little impact on the prosecution or planning of the war. As a result, in 1919 the Service Secretaries decided to revamp the board and increase its staff.¹⁰ With no additional legal authority or mutually conferred responsibilities, however, the revamped board had as little authority as its predecessor.

Nevertheless, the Joint Board took the first step toward defining distinct roles and missions for the Military Services by drafting the *Joint*

Action of the Army and the Navy in 1927. The *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* was a non-binding agreement published for “information and guidance” that spelled out the “general” and “secondary” functions of the Army and the Navy specifically to settle disputes between the Military Services in areas of overlapping duties and interests. Conflicts over turf were especially pronounced with respect to air power.¹¹ In fact, two full pages of the five page document were dedicated exclusively to defining the functions of each Military Service's air components.

The document was revised in 1935 with the intent of more clearly defining the roles and missions of each Military Service.¹² Its ultimate failure to do so prior to World War II, the maturation of air power, and lessons learned from the war set the stage for a major overhaul of the military establishment in the National Security Act of 1947.

World War II

“We must never fight another war the way we fought the last two. I have the feeling that if the Army and the Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much earlier.” —President Harry Truman¹³

The American military performance in World War II showed the *Joint Action* document to be a failure in clearly outlining individual Service functions and in guiding joint operations. The war demonstrated the critical need for true joint planning, well-defined Service functions, and a dedicated staff of military advisors to the President. The war highlighted the need for unity of command and increased efficiency throughout the defense establishment. The war also reinforced the American model of a civilian-led military. Further, attempts at reform during the war revealed and created rivalries between the Military Services that would have to wait until after the war's end to be addressed.

In 1942, after a conference with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the British Combined Chiefs of Staff, President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to form the Joint Chiefs of Staff to work with its British

counterpart and to address the need for improved joint planning and senior military advice to the President.¹⁴ Even before entering the war, Roosevelt had created the Executive Office of the President, placing “the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, to include the strategic planners of the Army and the Navy, under his direct control.”¹⁵ However, by the time of Roosevelt’s death in 1945 many political and military leaders had concluded that the responsibility for navigating turmoil and brokering compromises between the Army and the Navy should not fall squarely on the President but should be delegated to a dedicated senior official. This responsibility would ultimately be given to the Secretary of Defense.

As World War II unfolded, the need for unified commands and joint planning became more apparent. American military commanders saw, perhaps most vividly in the case of contested amphibious landings, this need for unity of command, joint planning, and joint doctrine. Army units in past wars and in early engagements of the war often had the benefit of landing and organizing before engaging in combat. However, Operation Torch, the planned Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942, afforded no such luxury. Joint planning principles espoused in the *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, as well as Service doctrine and procedures, were virtually ignored in planning Operation Torch. The War Plans Division—soon renamed the Operations Division—of the War Department insisted on unilateral Army planning with eventual coordination with the Navy.

The War Department would maintain responsibility for planning until execution under the Army commander of the joint expeditionary force. This planning method was consistent with the 1935 *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, demonstrating its lack of enforcement of joint planning or execution. Consequently, after the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff reviewed strategy and planning for the Mediterranean and made its recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff removed the planning from Army hands and assigned planning responsibility for Operation

Torch to the new allied commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.¹⁶ Through this and during the course of the war, Gen. Eisenhower witnessed firsthand the necessity of joint and unified command, saying later as President, “If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.”¹⁷

Convinced that the *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* was insufficient because of planning difficulties like Operation Torch, the Army pushed for a new document to address overlapping roles, while the Navy advocated revision of the existing document. As they could not agree, they recommended the matter be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁸ With this, World War II spelled the end of Service autonomy.

Toward the close of the war in Europe, the President and numerous senior military officers and members of Congress considered defense organizational reforms necessary to improve efficiency in planning and running operations, and to cope with expected force and budget draw downs in the postwar period. This was the first time a unified national defense program was seriously entertained, and the rivalry between the Military Services intensified. Previously, competition for resources between the Army and the Navy was almost nonexistent as each had separate legislation, service committees, and appropriations subcommittees.¹⁹

While the Joint Board called for Service cooperation in strategic planning, neither the process nor its results required immediate resourcing and thus sparked no controversy over resource allocations. Consequently, until serious debate began on housing the military establishment under a single executive department, the two Military Services rarely clashed politically. Inter-Service rivalries over resourcing came about only with the establishment of a unified national defense structure and the postwar decrease in military spending.²⁰

The leaders and benefactors of both Military Departments—the War Department and the Department of the Navy—held different views on how the military establishment should be

reformed. The War Department advocated unification in the form of a single Military Service with air, sea, and land elements, a plan that would be favorable to Army resourcing and command. In fact, as the OSD Historical Office wrote, "...in 1943 the Army attempted to create a single military department, in place of the War...and Navy Departments...However, disputes between the Army and the Navy were so contentious that the idea of unifying the two military departments had to be put off until after the war."²¹

In April 1944, the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy was formed and held hearings on a "Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces."²² The committee concluded that an executive department coordinating the Military Services was a good idea, but that they would have to wait until the war was over to make any reforms. The plan, however, faced fierce opposition from the Navy and Marines – the Navy to preserve its own air elements, the Marine Corps to maintain its existence.

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal needed an alternative plan and, on the advice of members of Congress, asked his friend and respected wartime resource manager Ferdinand Eberstadt to conduct a study. Thereafter, the Navy countered with a new plan drawing from Eberstadt's study – a single executive department coordinating three military departments: Army, Navy and Air Force. This plan would leave naval aviation and the Marines intact within the new Department of the Navy but would allow for the formation of a new Air Force Department and separate status as a Military Service. It would also create a weak Secretary of Defense and preserve Cabinet-level status for the Secretaries of each Military Department.

The Joint Chiefs also sought to influence the discussion of defense reform. In May 1944, they established a working group called the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense. Roughly a year later, after holding hearings and interviewing stakeholders, the committee issued a report favoring the establishment of a unified

Department of the Armed Forces,²³ which was delivered to the President for consideration. The Special Committee's report, however, was not unanimous with the Navy's representative dissenting.

The plan President Truman proposed to Congress left mission overlaps and questions of reporting structure, among other issues, to the first Secretary of Defense. President Truman believed that a unified national defense structure was necessary, and he sent a message to Congress stating his belief that "there is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department."²⁴

Proponents of a national defense department with civilian leadership viewed the cause as necessary to avoid duplication of effort by the Military Services and to allay fears of a general military staff. Using efficiency as a key argument for a national defense department easily won over President Truman who had risen to national prominence leading a Special Senate Committee charged with eliminating waste, fraud, and program cost overruns in the National Defense Program.²⁵ With tighter budgets, the country could not afford to waste funds on duplication of efforts (for example, two Services developing, fielding, and maintaining similar forces).

The German military's involvement in the initiation and perpetuation of both World Wars and Japanese militarism during the 1930s and 1940s reinforced the longstanding American opposition to powerful military machines that could take control of, or unduly dominate, American decision-making.²⁶ This deeply rooted antipathy towards military influence, born out of the nation's founders' historical memory of Oliver Cromwell and strengthened during the oppressive period of British colonial rule, was validated by the Axis powers in World War II.²⁷ Consequently, Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower, as well as congressional leadership, sought organizational means of maintaining and strengthening civilian oversight and decision-making over the military.

World War II demonstrated the need for significant changes in the defense establishment and fostered the creation of the American Joint

Chiefs of Staff, an informal structure later codified by law in the National Security Act of 1947. The postwar changes were intended to improve civilian control and efficiency in joint operations, joint planning, and unity of command. By war's end, the country's leadership – political and military – was engaged in a heated debate over how the defense establishment should be reformed.

The National Security Act of 1947

“It is now within our power to give the President the help he so urgently needs, and to replace the security organization of 1798 with the organization of 1947.”
—Senator John Chandler Gurney, then-Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee²⁸

In the immediate postwar years, there was a flurry of activity aimed at defense reform. Various congressional committees held hearings* and President Truman tried to iron out disagreements between the Army and the Navy. The resulting legislation, the National Security Act of 1947, represented a compromise between all the competing interests and various stakeholders.

Convincing Congress to pass defense reform proved challenging for several reasons. First, congressmen had their own self-interest in mind. Diffused authority over military affairs gave legislators greater leverage over decisions regarding where defense industries and military bases would be located.²⁹ Second, members of the House and Senate feared relinquishing any of their authority over military matters to the Executive Branch. They worried that, by creating a single executive department to handle military affairs, they could eventually see the diminution of their own power and oversight. Third, divisions between the Military Services

played themselves out in Congress; both the Army and the Navy had veterans and other supporters in Congress that sympathized with the divergent views of each Military Service.

President Truman worked hard to see the reforms through. In addition to pushing Congress forward, he worked closely with the Service Secretaries to help resolve areas of disagreement. As late as May 1946, the two Services continued to argue over several major areas of reform, the most serious of which was the Navy's continued opposition to full integration under one department, insisting that civilian Secretaries should continue to enjoy Cabinet rank. The two other contentious issues concerned the role of the Marine Corps and authority over aviation and air resources. Ultimately, Congress accepted a draft bill for unification proposed by President Truman and agreed upon by the Secretaries of War and the Navy and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act, along with Executive Order 9877, into law. Together they created the structure of the new national military establishment and assigned roles to the Military Services that would form the foundation of the Department of Defense for decades to come.

The National Security Act of 1947 codified and established many important institutions. The legislation accomplished the following:

- Officially created the “National Military Establishment,” the organizational predecessor of the Department of Defense. While the Military Services were finally unified under a single department, the way the roles and missions were defined allowed each Military Service to retain much of the power it had previously enjoyed. Each Military Service maintained its own Cabinet-level civilian Service Secretary.
- Created the Air Force as a separate Service. The Army Air Forces and the Army Air Corps were transferred to the newly established Service.
- Created the position of Secretary of Defense. This position established a civilian overseer of the National Military

* Congressional Committees involved in the reform process included the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, the House Committee on Naval Affairs, the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and the newly created Senate Committee on Armed Services.

Establishment, although his enumerated powers and small staff guaranteed that he would remain weak. President Truman would select Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal as the first Secretary of Defense, making the biggest critic of unification its biggest advocate.

- Legally codified the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The informal Joint Chiefs Staff established during World War II was institutionalized as a formal military advisory group. No chairman was created and all advice offered was based on consensus.³⁰

Executive Order 9877 supplemented the legislation's general statements about Military Service functions with more specific roles and responsibilities. It also included common Military Service functions. A significant portion of the language detailed in Executive Order 9877 is found in the first and subsequent versions of DoDD 5100.1.

While these documents were meant to settle jurisdictional disputes and create clear boundaries between the functions of each Service, many issues were left unsettled. The Services claimed that ambiguous language in the regulations created inconsistencies between them, and thus the disputes over turf continued.

The Key West Agreement

To resolve ongoing conflicts between the Military Services, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal brought the Service Chiefs together in Key West, Florida, in March 1948. The resulting document, known as the Key West Agreement, came to replace Executive Order 9877 and was intended to more clearly define the primary and collateral missions of each Military Service.³¹ The document limited previously broad Service functions, but preserved their right to collateral mission forces. For example, whereas Executive Order 9877 tasked the Navy with providing “naval combat and service forces, [and] naval aviation,” the Key West agreement revised the Navy’s general functions to include, “naval combat and service forces, *and such aviation as may be organic therein.*” These and other changes reduced conflicting mission-based claims over broad

segments of the defense establishment, but allowed the Military Services to continue to possess assets that might otherwise belong to the primary role of another Service (e.g. naval aviation).

The Key West Agreement was enacted with the signing of Executive Order 9950, and President Truman concurrently revoked Executive Order 9877. Notably, Executive Order 9950 was titled, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” a similar construction to the current title of DoDD 5100.1.

While the Key West Agreement sought to set forth the most clearly delineated set of roles and functions to date, it fell short. Instead, the Agreement reinforced the traditional prerogatives and individualism that it sought to overcome. The Military Services were still, in large measure, free to pursue almost any capabilities they desired. As historian David E. Johnson wrote:

What is particularly striking about the Key West Agreement is that it essentially assured the retention by each service of its traditional turf, thereby virtually guaranteeing, at best, duplication of effort and, at worst, incompatibility. The services were virtually autonomous because each retained its authority to “organize, train, and equip forces for joint operations” and “conduct research, to develop tactics, techniques and organization, and to develop and procure weapons, equipment, and supplies each service coordinating with the others in all matters of joint concern.”³²

The Key West Agreement also failed to address the increasingly contentious issue of nuclear weaponry and as a result, the Newport Conference was convened by Secretary Forrestal just a few months later.

The Newport Agreement

The Newport Agreement in conjunction with the Key West Agreement, are the two accords collectively considered to be the most direct predecessors of DoDD 5100.1.³³ Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff once again

took on the responsibility for crafting an agreement.

This brief accord included two significant changes to existing policy. First, it clarified the term “primary mission,” a phrase that was used in previous iterations of documents outlining the functions of each Military Service. The Newport Agreement concluded that a Military Service with the “primary mission” over a certain area of responsibility “must have exclusive responsibility for planning and programming and the necessary authority.” This was meant to preclude the Military Services from claiming incidental authority over functions primarily assigned to another Military Service.

The other significant change the Newport Agreement contributed to the roles and functions doctrine was spelling out authority over the interim “control and direction of atomic operations.” Because nuclear weapons had become a major source of contention between the Military Services, the Newport Agreement vested in the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force the responsibility for overseeing the atomic weapons program until an ongoing study conducted by the Military Liaison Committee determined the most appropriate long term strategy. The Newport Agreement represented the continuation of the debate over roles and missions and their necessary evolution.

1949 and Amendments to the National Security Act

Even in light of the Key West and Newport Agreements, problems continued – some institutional, some parochial. In postwar competition for resources, the inter-Service rivalry continued to drag Congress back into the roles and missions fray. Defense Secretary Forrestal continued to see the office of Secretary of Defense as being hindered by the office’s lack of clear authority over the military.³⁴ Additionally, several reforms were required to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff more effective. In early 1949, not long before Secretary Forrestal resigned his post, President Truman asked Eisenhower to return to active duty to preside over and set agendas for the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.³⁵ Eisenhower stayed less than a year, but he confirmed and furthered the recommendations Forrestal had made previously, specifically his belief that the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) must be formalized and further empowered with a Joint Staff of expanded size and responsibility. Consideration of recommendations, their incorporation into legislation, and the process of defense unification were not painless, however, with disputes between the Military Services often going to the White House or Congress for resolution.

The declining defense budget caused increased competition among the Military Services for limited resources and heightened scrutiny of forces in light of roles and missions. At the same time, the Military Services were loath to relinquish control over any areas in which they previously had authority. A notable example was the “revolt of the admirals” in 1949. When Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson decided to cancel the acquisition of the supercarrier *United States* in favor of funding for the B-36 bomber program and announced the transfer of Marine air assets to the Air Force, the Navy feared it would lose naval aviation entirely. Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan and a number of ranking admirals resigned in protest.³⁶

As a result, Cedric Worth, the special assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy, acting with the promise of anonymity, provided documents to a member of the House Armed Services Committee initiating an investigation into the B-36 program. A round of congressional hearings then examined roles and missions of the Navy and Air Force, with regard to aviation.³⁷ Ultimately, the Navy lost the battle for the carrier, and then-CJCS General of the Army General Omar Bradley characterized the problem as the Navy refusing to conform to unification.³⁸

As civilian and military leadership interpreted, tested the limits of, and gauged the effectiveness of the new defense structure, amendments were introduced to improve upon the 1947 defense architecture. The 1949

amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 established additional senior positions in the defense organization and strengthened the power of its leadership. Amendments included:

- Renaming the “National Military Establishment” the “Department of Defense.”
- Strengthening the power of the Secretary of Defense within the Department and over the Military Departments. This included removing Cabinet-level status of the Secretaries of the Military Departments.*
- Formally establishing the position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- Expanding the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the size of its staff.
- Establishing the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense to assist the Secretary.
- Renaming “Special Assistants” “Assistant Secretaries of Defense” and requiring that one be designated as Comptroller.

Despite the 1949 amendments, the Department and the Military Services continued struggling to improve efficiency and develop cooperative working relationships. In 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, thrusting the United States Armed Forces into conflict, and defense organizational reforms out of the spotlight. As a result, few reforms were enacted during this time. Notably, however, the Marine Corps Commandant was authorized to meet with the Joint Chiefs as a coequal member in matters of concern to the Marine Corps in accordance with Public Law 416, enacted on June 28, 1952. Additionally, language was added to the National Security Act specifying the composition and strength of the Marine Corps. Generally, however, legislation then – as during other major conflicts – centered on operational concerns.

* While previously the Army, Navy, and Air Force were “Executive Departments,” the 1949 amendments changed their status to “military departments.”

Eisenhower and the First DoDD 5100.1

The ascension of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the presidency in January 1953, just five months before the armistice between North and South Korea, led to historical changes in the defense establishment. His experiences as Army Chief of Staff, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an Allied (joint, unified) Commander, an informal chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and now as President uniquely qualified him to guide defense reform. Eisenhower’s new Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, quickly appointed and received recommendations from the Rockefeller Committee, which he tasked with reviewing the organization of the Department of Defense. Secretary Wilson forwarded the committee’s recommendations to the President, and, on the heels of armistice that year, Eisenhower introduced his [Defense] Reorganization Plan No. 6.

Changes to the Key West Agreement were then issued by Secretary of Defense Wilson in October 1953. These reflected legislation passed since the 1948 agreement, as well as Eisenhower’s Reorganization Plan No. 6, and included adding the Marine Corps Commandant to the JCS, validating the Defense Secretary as head of the DoD, clarifying the chain of command, and providing for the resourcing of unified commands. In 1954, a revised Key West Agreement reflecting these changes was reissued as the first iteration of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5100.1; it was signed by Wilson at the “direction of the President.”³⁹

In 1956, Defense Secretary Wilson issued a memorandum, “Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense,” in which he indicates that DoDD 5100.1 is the implementation of legislation.[†] In the same

[†] “The statement of roles and missions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West and Newport and approved by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, and as modified in 1953, has also proved to be sound and effectively to implement the intent of Congress as expressed in the National Security Act.”

document he also states that, while no major changes to roles and missions of the Armed Services seemed necessary, “clarification and clearer interpretation” of said roles and missions might become necessary because of “the development of new weapons” and “[the development] of new strategic concepts.”⁴⁰ He follows with a discussion of five problem areas, including Army aircraft use, airlift adequacy, air defense, Air Force tactical air support for the Army, and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs).

Further direction and changes provided in legislation and executive issuances did not spell a complete end to inter-Service rivalries, however. Such is evidenced by the dispute that arose between the Army and Air Force resulting in DoDD 5160.22, “Clarification of Roles and Missions of the Departments of the Army and the Air Force Regarding Use of Aircraft,” which Secretary of Defense Wilson issued in 1957.

Close Air Support: World War II Through the Cold War

Close air support (CAS) persists as a point of contention between the Military Services. The current joint definition of CAS is “air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”⁴¹ Pioneered by the German *Luftwaffe* during the Second World War, CAS quickly proved its speed and efficiency in comparison with ground artillery in supporting *Blitzkrieg* advances. The American CAS function, begun under the U.S. Army Air Forces, was assigned to the U.S. Air Force at its inception. The Air Force has had difficulty balancing strategic mission requirements with tactical CAS mission requirements.⁴²

Beginning with the Key West Agreement of 1948, limits were placed on aircraft maintained as part of the organic Army force structure to prevent the blurring of roles and missions. With the development of helicopters, the Army introduced the air cavalry concept, which it employed during the Korean War. CAS, neglected in capability and capacity by the Air Force in favor of strategic and air combat missions, was insufficient to meet Army CAS needs.⁴³ Jet fighters employed for CAS were designed for aerial combat and were much less effective against ground troops. Additionally, air-ground communications deteriorated after World War II such that, as late as the second year of the Korean War, Army and Air Force radios were not interoperable.⁴⁴ As a result, the Army began to develop air mobility in fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The combination of all these factors has historically caused friction between the Army and the Air Force over the CAS mission.

Three agreements between the Army and the Air Force were negotiated in 1949, 1951, and 1952. The first, signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Omar Bradley and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Hoyt Vandenberg, set parameters on Army organic aircraft by affixing specific weight limits for rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft.⁴⁵ Army Secretary Frank Pace and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter then removed the weight limitations and attempted

to define “organic” aircraft as those used within a certain distance of ground combat in their first agreement. This agreement also significantly stated that the Army could not duplicate Air Force capabilities in CAS, among other capabilities.⁴⁶ The second Pace-Finletter Agreement returned the weight restriction, this time with a higher ceiling and expanded the distance portion of the “organic” aircraft definition.⁴⁷

Following the first iteration of DoDD 5100.1 in 1954, Secretary of Defense C.E. Wilson signed a Memorandum and a Directive specifically addressing Army aviation. The 1956 Memorandum for Clarification of Roles and Missions reiterated the weight limit for Army fixed-wing aircraft, affixed a new weight limit for rotary-wing, and set airlift stipulations for Army aviation.⁴⁸ The 1957 DoDD 5160.22, “Clarification of Roles and Missions of the Departments of the Army and Air Force Regarding Use of Aircraft,” authorized specific non-airlift purposes for Army aircraft, limited Army airlift capacity, and made explicit expectations of the Air Force with regard to airlift and evacuation.⁴⁹

In 1966, the Air Force, suspicious of what appeared to be the development of another tactical air force, negotiated the Johnson-McConnell Agreement, signed by CSA Harold Johnson and CSAF John McConnell. The agreement removed rotary-wing aircraft as an Air Force CAS and tactical mobility platform. In exchange, the Army relinquished current and future fixed-wing tactical airlift aircraft.⁵⁰

The Air Force insisted on keeping the CAS mission but continued to neglect it, prompting investigations by the House Armed Services Committee in 1965, 1966, and 1971.⁵¹ Despite the need demonstrated in Korea, the Air Force still had insufficient air controller aircraft during the first years of the Vietnam conflict, forcing the Air Force to procure or transfer Army light observation aircraft and Navy attack aircraft to carry out CAS.⁵² In frustration, the Army developed the attack helicopter. Toward the close of the Vietnam conflict, the Army began developing the Cheyenne, a powerful, agile attack helicopter.⁵³ The Air Force, concerned about losing the CAS mission and sharing its air role, reluctantly fielded the A-10, the first and only aircraft designed specifically for CAS. The Cheyenne was cancelled and the Air Force tried to pull back on A-10 procurement, but Congress forced continuation of the procurement.⁵⁴

Goldwater-Nichols legislation and inter-Service discussions attempted to solve the CAS problem. For several years, the Air Force attempted to retire the A-10 from service. Engagement between the Army and Air Force culminated in the development and adoption of AirLand Battle Doctrine and the agreement known as “31 Initiatives” between CSA John Wickham and CSAF Charles Gabriel, paving the way for joint training and operations. In 1986, during the Goldwater-Nichols debate, the Air Force considered transfer of the A-10 and the CAS mission to the Army. However, the Army, finally satisfied with the Air Force CAS capability in the A-10, was not interested in funding its own procurement, training, and manpower requirements for CAS.⁵⁵ The Goldwater-Nichols Act provided additional guidance aimed at jointness in CAS, and the new language was subsequently introduced in DoDD 5100.1.

Toward Revision

“Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.” —President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a message to Congress on April 3, 1958.

Scientific and technological advances, as well as increased competition from the Soviet Union, intensified by the 1957 launch of *Sputnik* and reports of a U.S. “missile gap,” led once again to discussion of defense organizational reform.⁵⁶ President Eisenhower made defense reorganization a top priority of his administration and spearheaded the process by presenting recommendations to Congress.

He believed strongly that the peacetime military structure had to prepare the nation for unified war fighting, and he advocated strengthening unified commands, enhancing the power and control of the Secretary of Defense, streamlining the chain of command, and improving military efficiency while eliminating Military Service rivalries. He also proposed strengthening the military advisory staff to the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of Defense and restructuring the research and development components of the Department. President Eisenhower's proposals, however, would lead to a protracted battle with Congress over how to best reorganize the Department.

President Eisenhower was the driving force behind this reorganization process. In 1956, he created the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization (PACGO), chaired by Nelson Rockefeller, and tasked the members with crafting recommendations on the topic of "International Security: the Military Aspect." By the end of 1957, PACGO encouraged the President to begin drafting proposals to set the parameters of the discussion, and the President agreed, using his State of the Union Address to launch the national debate.⁵⁷

A major battle between the President and Congress ensued. The most contentious issues dealt with appropriations and Department unity. President Eisenhower believed that, rather than having each individual Military Service appeal to Congress for appropriations, Congress should make a lump sum allocation to the Department of Defense and allow the Secretary of Defense to distribute the resources according to the strategic needs of the Department.

He believed such a system would increase efficiency by reducing overlap, thereby reducing overall cost. Unwilling to delegate any of their power over appropriations, Congress rejected this idea outright. The other major area of disagreement was over congressional access to Pentagon testimony. While Congress wanted to continue having unfettered access to any civilian or military official it wished to question, the President felt strongly that discussions of national security should take place within the

Department of Defense, and that the Department should then speak with one voice.⁵⁸

President Eisenhower was undeterred by congressional opposition. He met frequently with congressional leaders and Pentagon officials, held breakfasts for Republican congressmen, reached out to influential friends and the heads of private companies asking them to lobby Congress, and provided each of his Cabinet members with sample letters and encouraged them to write letters to Congress. When asked what he would do to see the reorganization pass, the President commented, "I would get onto the air as often as the television companies would let me on. I would keep it up until I would have the United States understanding that it is their pocketbook...more than that, it is their safety."⁵⁹

While the matter was initially characterized as a bout between branches of government, it later devolved into a partisan fight with Congressman Carl Vinson (D-GA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, leading the opposition against the President. Accordingly, President Eisenhower sought to instill strict party discipline and enlisted the support of the Republican leadership to help pass the legislation. Ultimately the most contentious issues - appropriating lump sums to the Department of Defense, and restricting congressional testimony of lower ranking officials - were dropped from the bill. However, President Eisenhower was able to retain two features of the legislation he characterized as most important - the clarification over roles and missions and the modified chain of command.

Congress passed the 1958 Reorganization Act unanimously on July 18, 1958.⁶⁰ While the vote demonstrated unanimous support for the final version of the bill, President Eisenhower had to sacrifice certain elements of reform, making compromise a central factor in passing reorganization legislation. The legislation became Public Law 85-599 (72 Stat. 514), amending the National Security Act and U.S. code. The law, signed into law by President Eisenhower on August 6, 1958 became the basis for many of the changes in the revised version of DoDD 5100.1, released later that year.

1958 Revisions to DoDD 5100.1

The 1958 revisions to DoDD 5100.1 contained some of the most significant changes to the document to date. These changes further empowered the Secretary of Defense and diminished the authorities of the Military Departments. The changes, based on the Reorganization Act and reflected in the amended directive, accomplished the following:

- **Modified the chain of command.** The Military Services were removed from the operational chain of command, allowing the Commanders of the Combatant Commands to bypass the Military Services and communicate directly through the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Secretary of Defense.
- **Empowered the Secretary of Defense.** The Secretary of Defense was given the power to exercise full authority, direction, and control over the Department.⁶¹ This allowed for the establishment of new agencies or positions, the reassignment of responsibilities among members of the Department, and reorganization of the Department. The directive also cited the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for the first time, and included within the Office the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, a position newly created by the 1958 Reorganization Act.
- **Enhanced the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The Joint Chiefs of Staff came to “constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense” and the Chairman of the group now had a formal vote. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was also directed to provide joint intelligence for use within the Department and to “prepare” integrated logistic plans instead of “reviewing” the plans formerly drafted by the Services.
- **Empowered the unified and specified commands.** The common functions of the Military Departments and Services narrowed to “Organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to unified and specified commands.” (*Emphasis added*). This limited the Military Services to force

development and planning missions and transferred force employment missions to the Unified and Specified Commands, as the Combatant Commanders were given “full operational control over the forces assigned to them.”

In addition, the Military Services were directed to prepare and submit their budgets to the Secretary of Defense based partly on the advice of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands. The Unified and Specified Commanders also had a more direct line within the chain of command as the Military Services were removed. The Unified Command Plan appears for the first time in the document and is designated as a source prescribing Unified and Specified Command functions.

- **More clearly delineated certain roles and functions.** The Air Force lost its role of maintaining “forces” for land-based air defense. The Marine Corps was assured of its survival by securing language in the Reorganization Act of 1958 (and now in DoDD 5100.1) that the Corps would include “not less than three combat divisions and three air wings and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.” The Army became responsible for domestic emergencies and the “authorized civil works program.”

The Enduring Defense Structure: 1958-1986

After the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the functions of the Department of Defense and its major components were left largely unchanged for almost three decades. Although DoDD 5100.1 was updated several times during this period, the changes made were generally minor. However, this was not for lack of initiative on the part of senior leaders. Successive administrations called for defense reform and set up their own committees to study reorganization.

These included President Kennedy’s Symington Committee on the Defense

Establishment,* President Nixon's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, and President Carter's Defense Organization Studies. The changes made to the Directive during this time period are described below.

June 1966 Revision: Two new clauses were added to the Directive. One directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include the Defense Supply Agency in the preparation of integrated logistic plans, and the other made the Joint Chiefs responsible for providing military guidance for use by the defense agencies. The only other change in this edition of the directive was the addition of a section at the end of the document listing Defense Agencies and their chartering directives. This period saw a considerable expansion of Defense agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

June 1969 Revision: This revision altered language regarding the logistic responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, it made the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for reviewing and recommending appropriate logistic guidance for the Military Services to the Secretary of Defense. It also assigned the Military Services responsibility for recommending logistic guidance for their respective departments to the Secretary of Defense.

March 1977 Revision: This revision offered no substantive changes. It merely changed "DSA" to "DIA" in the list of Defense Agencies found at the end of the document. It did not alter the roles or functions of any entity within the Department.

Defining the Role of the Marine Corps

Throughout its history, there have been several attempts to "legislate, administrate, or remodel the Marine Corps out of existence."⁶² President Herbert Hoover first suggested merging the Marines with the Army in 1930 as a means to save money during the Great Depression, but as a result of a public relations campaign conducted by the Marines, they were able to deliver more than 10,000 supportive telegrams to the White House mailbox, effectively deferring the issue until after World War II. As President Harry Truman sought to reorganize the defense establishment, the question of eliminating the Marine Corps once again surfaced. In an effort to save his Service, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Alexander A. Vandegrift appeared before the Senate Commission on Naval Affairs on May 6, 1946, and delivered his famous "bended knee" speech stating:

"Sentiment is not a valid consideration in determining questions of national security. We have pride in ourselves and in our past, but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the Nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our Corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, we must go."⁶³

Vandegrift's testimony, in conjunction with additional support from friends in Congress, helped save the Marine Corps from extinction, but the National Security Act of 1947 left out any mention of Marine Corps roles and functions and did not include the Marines in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Vandegrift was quite perturbed that the Marines' roles and functions were left undefined, as he felt this omission rendered any mention of the Marine Corps meaningless.⁶⁴

* The Symington Report was actually commissioned by Senator John F. Kennedy while he was the Democratic Presidential nominee. The report was issued November 1960, two months before Kennedy officially assumed the office of the President.

The Marine Corps' roles and missions were more clearly outlined during the Key West Conference in 1948, to which the Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates, was not even invited. As a result, the Marines were relegated principally to conducting amphibious operations.⁶⁵

In August 1950, Representative Gordon L. McDonough (R-CA) wrote to President Truman requesting consideration to allow the Commandant of the Marine Corps to serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Truman replied, "For your information, the Marine Corps is the Navy's police force, and as long as I am President that is what it will remain."⁶⁶ The congressman made the letter public, forcing Truman to make a public apology.

A more sustained effort at gaining a position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff took place in 1952 with the proposal of Public Law 416, which also sought to give additional legal recognition to the Marine Corps to prevent any future possibility of disbanding it. The Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations all testified against the legislation.⁶⁷ The bill ultimately passed and established in law that the Marine Corps "includes not less than three combat divisions and three air wings," language that still appears in DoDD 5100.1 today. However, the law permitted the Commandant of the Marine Corps to participate in Joint Chiefs of Staff proceedings only when issues being considered were directly related to the Marine Corps.

This status persisted until 1978 when circumstances brought the issue of the Commandant's status to a head. In August 1977, then-Commandant General Louis Wilson was passed over to assume the position of Acting CJCS when all other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be out of town. The other Service chiefs declared that General Wilson was not a full member, and they designated the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force as the Acting Chairman instead of the Marine Corps Commandant. Infuriated, General Wilson committed himself to changing the National Security Act and Title 10 of the U.S. Code to obtain truly equal status for the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁶⁸ Using his personal connections on Capitol Hill and calling together the "Congressional Marines," former Marines serving in, or working for, Congress, General Wilson garnered the necessary support for his reform. Despite some bumps along the road, including a presidential veto from President Jimmy Carter, on October 20, 1978, the Commandant of the Marine Corps officially became a "full" member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the passage of Public Law 95-485.⁶⁹

September 30, 2005, was a momentous occasion for the Marine Corps as General Peter Pace became the first Marine Corps general officer to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Notably, he was also the first Marine to serve as Vice Chairman, a position he held from October 1, 2001 through August 12, 2005. General Pace's ascension to the position of Chairman signified the ultimate triumph of the Service in its quest for equality within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Defense reform legislation has a history of seeking to relegate the Marine Corps to an inferior status among the Services, or to try and eliminate the Marines outright. Not surprisingly then, the Marine Corps approaches reorganization cautiously and seeks the inclusion of specific language that will guarantee its continued role as an equal among the Services.

January 1980 Revision: This was one of the few significant changes to DoDD 5100.1 that occurred during this time period. In accordance with Public Law 95-485 (1978), the Marine Corps Commandant became a full and equal

member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While the Marine Corps Commandant had previously had a voice only in discussions that directly pertained to the Marines, he was now a coequal on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, participating fully in every aspect of decision-making.

This change was a direct result of lobbying done by, and on behalf of, the Marine Corps after the Commandant had been snubbed and passed over for the opportunity to serve as Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when all other members were out of town.⁷⁰ The 1980 DoDD 5100.1 revisions updated the document to reflect this change.

May 1985 Revision: The Coast Guard was introduced into this revision of the document, though not dealt with comprehensively. During times of war, the Coast Guard was to function as a Military Service under the Department of the Navy as per 14 U.S.C. sections 2, 3, 145. The relationship between the Coast Guard and the Navy had been formalized through the establishment of the NAVGUARD Board in November 1980 to ensure greater interoperability, since the Coast Guard had significantly contributed to the U.S. efforts in Vietnam, and might be expected to perform similar functions in future operations. This iteration also included language about the Inspector General of the Department of Defense and assigned the CJCS the role of spokesman for the commanders of the Combatant Commands on operational requirements.

January 1986 Revision: In this revision, space operations were introduced as Military Department functions for the first time. Each Military Service shared equal responsibility for space operations and had space included within their primary functions. The Department became increasingly interested in space during the 1980s because of the Soviet space threat, the escalating dependence of the United States on space systems, and a growing desire to leverage space capabilities more effectively.⁷¹ To address these issues, the U.S. set up a Combatant Command, the United States Space Command, in 1985.

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and Related Changes to DoDD 5100.1

Between the major defense organizational overhauls of 1958 and 1986, operational failures made the need for reform apparent. A string of

operational failures in the 1970s and 80s led some senior military leaders and members of Congress to advocate for reforms tackling the biggest problems – problems not new to the American defense establishment, but highlighted by recent events and subsequent examination of the Department. Discussion of reform focused in particular on the inability of the Military Services to operate jointly, the lack of unity of command, and the diluted military advice being delivered to political leadership.* President Ronald Reagan and many in the Department of Defense initially opposed the changes, but later supported significant reforms prior to the passage of legislation. After several years of hearings, commissions, and studies, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act became law in 1986. Statutory changes made by this legislation account for nearly all the changes reflected in the April 1987 iteration of DoDD 5100.1.

The 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis and the failed high-profile joint rescue mission, Operation Eagle Claw/Evening Light, renewed the call for defense reform in 1980.⁷² The failed rescue attempt, also known as Desert One,[†] resulted in the deaths of eight U.S. servicemen and highlighted the lack of sound military advice being delivered to senior leaders, the disunity of command, and a serious lack of joint interoperability. The Holloway Report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff official investigation of the Desert One failure released in 1980, identified these and other deficiencies.⁷³

Earlier disappointments, including the seizure of the *USS Pueblo* in 1968, the costly rescue of the *USS Mayaguez* crew in 1975, and chain of command problems evidenced during strategic bombing campaigns of the Vietnam conflict highlighted the need for better military advice, joint interoperability, and a direct, clear, and joint chain of command. Still, it was not until almost two years after the Iran Hostage

* Reforms also focused on areas not salient to discussion here such as personnel management, acquisition cost overruns, and waste.

† Desert One refers to the operation's staging area in a remote desert location in Iran.

Crisis that real change in the Department of Defense began to be seriously considered.

In early 1982, then-CJCS Air Force General David Jones shocked the political and defense establishments when he published an article pointing out problems in defense organization and presenting his recommendations to fix them. In February 1982, just five months before the end of his tenure, during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), General Jones presented his plea for reform. As the first sitting senior military leader in decades to call for change, he stated, "The system is broken. I have tried to reform it from inside, but I cannot. Congress is going to have to mandate necessary reforms."⁷⁴

His plan for moderate reform – strengthening the CJCS, limiting Service staff involvement in joint processes, and improving joint training, experience, and incentives – sparked intense debate.⁷⁵ General Jones' continued advocacy after retirement is credited by some as the "most important factor in ultimately bringing about the Goldwater-Nichols Act."⁷⁶

Calls for defense reform by senior military leaders, in conjunction with other testimony supporting reform, led to congressional jockeying between the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. In response to the Desert One fiasco and the increased call for reform from senior military leaders, in the spring of 1982, the HASC Investigations Subcommittee began five months of hearings on "Joint Chiefs of Staff reform" under its new chair, Representative William Nichols (D-AL). During these hearings, General Edward Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, promoted his own plan requiring even greater change to existing defense organization and functions than advocated by General Jones.⁷⁷ Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO), an ardent and vocal supporter of reform, introduced a resolution that directly paralleled General Meyer's plan.⁷⁸

In the end most of these ideas were not adopted, but the support for reform by Meyers, a Service Chief, helped the case for reform in general. The HASC Investigations subcommittee produced a Joint Chiefs of Staff

reform bill that passed the House later that year, but the bill was not entertained by the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) because of strong opposition by Senators John Tower (R-TX) and John Warner (R-VA). Senator Tower had close ties to the Navy and harbored aspirations to become the Secretary of Defense, while Senator Warner, a former Secretary of the Navy, saw the reforms as undue criticism and interference by the Congress.⁷⁹

In June 1983, Senator Tower, the SASC chairman, launched a series of hearings on defense reform, including Joint Chiefs of Staff reorganization. In August, the House again passed a Joint Chiefs of Staff reform bill introduced by Congressman Nichols' HASC Investigations Subcommittee, and Senator Tower once again did not allow the bill to be considered in the SASC. It appeared that defense reform might continue to languish in committee interminably.

In October 1983, soon after Senator Tower appointed staffer James Locher to oversee a defense reorganization study, two events demonstrated the urgency for defense reform. On October 23, 1983, the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, was bombed. The Long Commission, appointed by the Secretary of Defense one month after the bombing, criticized the "tortured chain of command" and the dangerously restrictive rules of engagement responsible for the disaster. Additionally, inter-service tensions surfaced over the transport of wounded Marines flown by the Air Force to West Germany for treatment rather than to a closer hospital at a naval base in Italy.

Two days later on October 25, 1983, Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada, commenced. U.S. Forces defeated the vastly inferior Cuban force (in Grenada to support the short-lived revolution there), in spite of an almost total lack of communication between the Military Services during the planning and execution of the operation. Historian Gordon Lederman stated that the two events "...revealed a weak Joint Chiefs of Staff lacking influence on military policy and a confused chain of command.... [and] symbolized the U.S. military's glaring

failure to plan and execute effective joint operations.”⁸⁰ The need for defense reform was glaring.

Despite the growing agreement on the need for defense reorganization, senior leaders in the Executive Branch remained opposed to the idea of reform. In an effort to defend against critics, President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger supported the findings of Weinberger’s own in-house Joint Chiefs of Staff study that claimed significant reform was unnecessary and could have detrimental consequences. Secretary Weinberger, who saw calls for reform as an attack on his management of the Department remained steadfast in his opposition, and was one of the last significant stakeholders to agree to reform. The Service Chiefs, with the exception of General Meyer, opposed reform.

The arguments against reform as affirmed by Weinberger and the majority of the Service Chiefs can be summarized as follows: “(1) the risk of a single entity usurping civilian control (CJCS), (2) the importance of providing a wide variety of views to the Secretary of Defense and President, and (3) the need to maintain the direct linkage between the role of the Service Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff principal functions, which served to enhance capabilities.”⁸¹

Advocates of reform remained undeterred in the face of opposition. Former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and Harold Brown and legislators of both parties continued to support crucial reforms in opposition to the Reagan White House and current Defense leadership. The mid-1980s were marked by widespread dissatisfaction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and quality of advice in the Service-dominated process, stemming in no small part from former-CJCS David Jones’ criticisms.⁸²

Despite his initial opposition to reform, support for specific modifications from former senior officials created doubt in President Reagan’s mind. He consequently asked Secretary Weinberger to address former-CJCS Jones’ concerns. Weinberger proposed small changes including making the CJCS the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. Secretary Weinberger

drafted language at the insistence of the President and forwarded it to Congress, after which the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, publicly opposed the changes and rallied enough support to derail action on the drafted reforms.⁸³

Following these events, conference negotiations ensued between the House and Senate. It was only then that Representative Nichols and other House members were able to attach language to the FY 1985 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) making the CJCS the spokesman for the Combatant Commanders on operational requirements.

A 1985 iteration of DoDD 5100.1 followed the NDAA of 1985. Besides the added CJCS’ functions, the 1985 revision also explained how, during times of war, the Coast Guard was to function as a Military Service under the Department of the Navy as provided in 14 U.S.C. Sections 2, 3, 145. Despite passage of the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978, the Department of Defense still did not have an IG in 1982, prompting Congress to amend the Act to require the Department of Defense to have an Inspector General. In late 1983, Congress also established the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation to improve efficiency and eliminate waste. The Grace Commission, a Reagan-appointed investigation into waste across the Federal Government, also released its report in 1984, noting inefficiencies within the Department of Defense and prompting the creation of the DoD Inspector General. The 1985 revision of DoDD 5100.1 reflected these efforts to improve efficiency and eliminate waste, mentioning the DoD Inspector General and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation for the first time.

With a key change of leadership in the SASC and new support from the White House, opposition to reforms diminished. Upon Senator Tower’s retirement on January 3, 1985, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) took over as chairman of the SASC, allowing more reform debate and legislation out of the committee and onto the floor. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report that mirrored the proposals of former-CJCS, General Jones,⁸⁴ and the much-anticipated Locher Report, a

SASC committee staff study, completed its findings.

The SASC study led to a Joint Chiefs of Staff review of Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, the results of which fed into Executive inputs and recommendations for the Goldwater-Nichols Act.⁸⁵ Later that year, President Reagan demonstrated his acquiescence to the defense reform debate when he appointed the Packard Commission, a Blue Ribbon Commission, to examine problems and make recommendations. Secretary of Defense Weinberger initially opposed the idea of the President's Commission, requiring President Reagan to reassure Weinberger that the Commission was not related to Weinberger's job performance.⁸⁶ In 1985, the President also nominated Admiral William Crowe, who was open to defense reform, to be the new CJCS. With the President's support, defense reforms were finally achievable.

The Packard Commission released recommendations that were immediately implemented by President Reagan through National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219 on April 1, 1986. The President then decided to expand upon NSDD 219 and addressed further DoD reforms in a message to Congress later that month. Much of the substance of NSDD 219 and the President's recommendations to Congress were incorporated into the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which finally passed the House and Senate with wide margins and was signed into law on October 1, 1986.

James Locher, a lead SASC staffer who helped draft Goldwater-Nichols language and author the previously mentioned report, stated that the objectives of this historic legislation were to:

1. Strengthen civilian authority.
2. Improve military advice to the President (in his constitutionally specified capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces), secretary of defense, and National Security Council.
3. Place clear responsibilities on the unified commanders-in-chief for mission accomplishment.

4. Ensure that a unified commander's authority is commensurate with his responsibilities.
5. Increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning.
6. Provide for the more efficient use of resources.
7. Improve joint officer management.
8. Enhance the effectiveness of military operations.
9. Improve Defense Department management and administration.⁸⁷

Goldwater-Nichols was the second most far-reaching defense reorganization instituted since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, and it accounts for almost all of the changes made to the following iteration of DoDD 5100.1 signed out in April 1987. The extensive changes made generally fall into three broad categories:

- **Empowered the CJCS.** The Chairman became the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff were also placed under the Chairman's exclusive direction, and the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created. This considerably reduced the role and influence of the Service Chiefs.
- **Empowered the Combatant Commands/Commanders.** Functions previously held by the Military Services were transferred to them.
- **Increased and improved jointness and efficiency among the Services.***

Many of the changes follow the legislation verbatim. Of the changes that do not, nearly all, nonetheless, originate in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. These revisions to the Directive either expound upon or clarify lengthy or vague language found in the legislation (e.g., "improve efficiency between Services" is expanded upon in the April 1987 iteration of DoDD 5100.1).

* For more information on Joint Operations, see p. 21.

Some of the changes to DoDD 5100.1 in April 1987 were not a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Additional defense-related legislation was passed between iterations of the Directive. For example, the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the NDAA of 1987 created Special Operations Command (SOCOM), a change that was included in the April 1987 iteration of DoDD 5100.1. Additionally, new language in the Directive also reflected advances in technology requiring their related functions to be assigned within the Department.

This included language related to space operations (an area of interest to proponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative) and electronic warfare. Lastly, a few additions to military functions reflected official Service and Department lessons learned. These additions include new language on psychological operations, operations other than war, and special operations. In summary, almost all of the major changes to the Directive can be attributed to organizational and operational improvement, technological advancement, and changes based on lessons learned (e.g. empowerment of the CJCS and COCOM commanders, space functions, and operations other than war, respectively).

Only one substantive change made to the April 1987 revision of DoDD 5100.1 (updated version dated 25 September 1987) cannot be accounted for after a review of legislation, scholarly works, and internal documentation. This revision omits a line from the “Functions of the Department of Defense” section (Section 3)

stating that one of the common functions of the Armed Forces is to, “Safeguard the internal security of the United States.”

This omission is especially curious given the climate of the 1980s that saw an interest in increasing the military’s role in civil affairs as evidenced by the revision of the Posse Comitatus Act and passage of the Military Cooperation with Civil Law Enforcement Officials Act, both passed in 1981.⁸⁸

There are several reasons why this language may have been removed. One possibility is that it was believed to be a redundant statement already encapsulated in the first clause of that section, which reads, “1. Support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.” Another explanation is that the removal followed a legal assessment that found this language to be in conflict with federal law including the standing Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 barring the use of the military for domestic law enforcement.

Lastly, it is possible that “internal security” was no longer deemed to be a function of the Department of Defense. Regardless of the reason for the omission, many internal military documents and briefs produced since the removal of the language have continued to list this fourth function and cite DoDD 5100.1 as its source even though it no longer appears there.⁸⁹

A second 1987 iteration of DoDD 5100.1 issued in September of that year included a short, new paragraph stating the function of the DoD IG as addressed in the IG Act.

Joint Operations

“Joint doctrine’s roots reach back to the commanders who first dealt with the timeless problems of coordinating military operations among land, sea and, later, air forces. The challenges inherent in coordinating different military forces have existed since armies became distinct from navies.” —Joint Military Operations Historical Collection

The focus on joint operations during the Goldwater-Nichols reform process was not new. In fact, coordinating Military Services for joint action dates as far back as the nation’s founding when, during the Revolutionary War in the Battle of Yorktown, the American Army worked with the French Navy to bring about the final surrender of British forces through a coordinated land campaign and naval barrage and blockade. While a handful of operational disappointments during the 1970s and 80s led to a review of joint planning and doctrine, American military history is replete with examples of successful joint action that have positively demonstrated the benefits

of combined operations. A few historical examples of successful joint operations are described below.

The Mexican-American War was one of the first times joint operations between the U.S. Military Services were undertaken. The most celebrated joint action of the war was the landing and siege of Veracruz that took place in March 1847, which was the first major amphibious operation in American history.⁹⁰ U.S. forces used specially designed landing craft that allowed the U.S. to land and deploy over ten thousand troops during the 15 month Veracruz-Mexico City campaign.⁹¹ President James K. Polk praised the operation saying, "There was concert between the heads of the two arms of the service...By this means their combined power was brought to bear successfully on the enemy."⁹²

Using government records from the Mexican-American War to draw doctrinal guidance, Union military leaders made joint operations a part of their strategy during the Civil War.⁹³ Several campaigns in North Carolina demonstrated this cooperative approach. The first joint operation of the war took place at the Hatteras Inlet, considered the gateway to vital sea lanes and the location of North Carolina's "Mosquito Fleet." It was here that the Navy was to fire upon the forts guarding the Inlet while the Army disembarked from the ships and prepared for a ground assault. In the end, naval forces overwhelmed the Confederate forces, obviating the need for a land campaign; however, the very notion that the Military Services had conducted joint planning was revolutionary.⁹⁴ A truly joint operation took place at, and in the lead up to, New Bern. This was one of the first times a "creeping barrage" was employed, whereby gunboats helped pave the way for land forces.⁹⁵ During battle, the Military Services worked in conjunction in that the Navy supplied firepower while the Army advanced. The success of the campaign demonstrated the benefit of joint action and the need for its employment in later campaigns.

Despite the success of joint action throughout the nation's history, it has been said that joint operations did not come of age until World War II.⁹⁶ It was during this time that the first joint commands were created,⁹⁷ and the military establishment came to highly value unity of command, a key principle in Operation Overlord, the full-scale invasion of Europe.⁹⁸ However, despite this novel approach to military organization, Military Service rivalries and parochialism continued throughout the war, which led to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

Despite the challenges of joint operation during World War II, one area in which jointness was hailed by some as a success was in the field of intelligence. Joint intelligence was active in every theater and improved the collection, production, and dissemination of critical information throughout the war effort.⁹⁹ It also reduced duplication of effort and conflicting assessments of conditions. The Military Services also found that Army and Navy intelligence supplemented the other, helping to provide a larger picture of current realities. This positive cooperation was exemplified by the *J.I.C. Daily*, a unified intelligence publication that was prepared for senior decision-makers. J.I.C.s came to be so highly valued that they were left intact to continue serving the Joint Staff and government policymakers after hostilities had ceased.¹⁰⁰

Another noteworthy joint operation during World War II was the Doolittle Raid on Japan that took place on April 18, 1942. The air attack was conducted by Army twin-engine bombers that were launched from a ship, the aircraft carrier *Hornet*.¹⁰¹

The Inchon Invasion during the Korean War was also a successful joint operation undertaken by the Army, Navy, Marines, and South Korean forces. Considered a major turning point in the war, the campaign required the cooperation and smooth integration of the Military Services. Despite its overwhelming success in retrospect, the Military Services demonstrated intense resistance to the initial plan due to its perceived riskiness. As the Naval Historical Center wrote, "It took all of MacArthur's unparalleled powers of persuasion to sell his concept to

doubting Army, Navy, and Marine Corps commanders.”¹⁰² The first phase of the battle was an early morning assault by the Marines to guard the approach to the harbor at Inchon, followed by Army forces and additional Marine reinforcements. The Navy’s Gunfire Support Group worked in conjunction with aircraft Task Force 77 to attack the shore defenses before a ground invasion. Within another three days, Marine and Army forces had advanced far enough to have captured the nearby airfield, allowing Marine aircraft to begin flight operations from the site. Within roughly a week’s time, the Navy had delivered over 25,000 people, 4,500 vehicles, and 14,000 tons of cargo.¹⁰³ The collaborative operation allowed the U.S. to turn the tide of the ongoing conflict.

The U.S. Military has been coordinating joint actions for centuries. While each operation has had varying degrees of success, the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to legislatively solidify and improve upon the most successful practices for the conduct of joint operations in the future.

The 2002 Revision

The 1987 iteration of DoDD 5100.1 reflecting the changes instituted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the last major overhaul of the document. In 2002, the Department of Defense updated the Directive, but included only one noteworthy change of direct interest to the Secretary of Defense; the Directive assigned space operations to the Air Force as a primary function, while space operations continued to be a collateral function of the other Services. Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was exceptionally interested in the space domain and had, in fact, served as the Chairman of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization directly before assuming the position of Secretary of Defense.

The report of the commission, which was released on January 11, 2001, (just ten days before Rumsfeld assumed the position of Secretary) recommended that, “The Department of the Air Force... be designated as the Executive Agent for Space within the Department of Defense, with Department-wide responsibility for planning, programming and acquisition of space systems.”

It further suggested that, “The Department of the Air Force...be assigned responsibility to organize, train, and equip for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive space operation.” The Space Commission also addressed the longstanding issue of how space responsibilities are shared between the defense

and intelligence communities, and whether or not they should be integrated. While the commission made several recommendations for improved alignment, full integration was not recommended, and thus the Directive only describes Air Force space roles and missions as they relate to strategic military objectives.¹⁰⁴

The 2002 revision also removed explicit reference to the Comptroller as this became an Under Secretary of Defense position covered by other more general language and substituted “Combatant Commands” for all references to “unified and specified commands.”

The last significant change made to the 2002 iteration was the unintentional omission of “electronic warfare” as a primary function of the Army, while the Departments of the Navy and Air Force continued to retain this responsibility. While there seems to be no legislative or internal Department documentation to account for the removal of this function, following the end of the Cold War, the Army allowed its electronic warfare capabilities to lapse though this area has recently been reinvigorated.*¹⁰⁵

* With no direct competitor and a change in the type of operations being executed, electronic warfare lost priority among other competing interests. It was not until the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 that the Army recognized the danger and severity of its capability gap. The Army has since reinvigorated its recruitment and training in this area.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Recommendations and Recent Calls for Change

Recommendations on roles and functions from the CJCS, required by Goldwater-Nichols, were submitted in 1989, 1993, and 1997, but have never resulted in changes to DoDD 5100.1. A few days before his retirement in 1989, Admiral William Crowe submitted his recommendations as CJCS and recommended, among other things, that the Air Force be assigned primary responsibility for defensive and offensive space operations.¹⁰⁶

Just a few days later the new CJCS, General Colin Powell, made recommendations that reversed positions on several issues, including the longstanding and contentious issue of close air support (CAS), in a memo to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. The memo also expressed his opinion that there was no reason to change DoDD 5100.1 with regard to the assignment of the CAS mission.^{107*}

Following the 1993 recommendations from General Powell, a Congressional Commission on Roles and Missions was formed to make their own recommendations. The Commission, chaired by Dr. John White (later to become Deputy Secretary of Defense), was charged with defining the specific roles and missions of the Military Services and identifying unnecessary duplication of capabilities.

In 1995, after studying 26 (later reduced to 25) issues, the commission released its recommendations.[†] However, Secretary of Defense William Perry indicated that the Department of Defense had significant concerns with several of the recommendations including those regarding outsourcing, deep attack, and Reserve components.¹⁰⁸

Since General Powell's recommendations on roles and missions, numerous studies and reports have called for new reforms in Defense organization and reiterated the need for improved efficiency within the Department. In 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen chartered the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its Co-Chairs Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, to analyze the international security environment and develop innovative strategies to improve U.S. national security policy.

The Commission's report, released in three phases, made specific recommendations regarding Department of Defense structure and alignment aimed at improving the acquisition process, resource allocations, and overall departmental efficiency.¹⁰⁹

More recently, the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) launched a project entitled "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," outlining their recommendations for reforms to the national security apparatus. The report, released in four phases between 2004-2008, addressed the full range of defense issues including organizational structure, effective resource allocation, joint procurement, strengthening civilian defense personnel, improved interagency and coalition operations, strengthened congressional oversight,¹¹⁰ officer management and education, improved organization for space and cyberspace operations,¹¹¹ and many other issues of relevance to the Department.

The report released in the third phase of this effort included recommendations on the possible roles, missions, and structure of the Reserve Components.¹¹² In 2009, two of the principal authors of these studies, Michele Flournoy and Kathleen Hicks, took on senior leadership positions within the Department of Defense under President Barack Obama, becoming the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces, respectively. Other authors and contributors included former DoD and industry leaders.

* For more information on Close Air Support, see pages 11 and 26.

† Commission recommendations included focus on operations other than war including humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, information warfare, peace operations, and other functions.

The Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review (QRM) Report, released in January 2009 and mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, is the latest official study on DoD roles, missions, and functions. The document reflects a new focus on interagency cooperation, intratheater airlift, unmanned aerial vehicles or systems (UAVs/UAS),* cyber warfare, and irregular warfare. USSOCOM also receives special attention given its unique functions, responsibilities, and authorities similar to those of the Military Services.

In addition to directing the Department of Defense to conduct a roles and missions review, the House Armed Services Committee also formed a Panel on Roles and Missions chaired by Congressman Jim Cooper (D-TN).

In the last quarter of 2009, Congressman Cooper published an article in *Joint Forces Quarterly* calling for revisions in the budgeting process in order to combat enduring Military Service parochialism in acquisitions. Notably, the congressman's recommendations closely mirror those budgeting proposals suggested by President Eisenhower and rejected by Congress fifty years ago.¹¹³

The Chairman's recommendations†, the 2009 QRM, and recent think tank and commissioned studies all demonstrate the need to update DoDD 5100.1 to either institutionalize

* UAVs have been a source of contention primarily between the Army and Air Force, especially as the Air Force sought to become executive agent for all UAV operations. The Army, along with the other Military Services, sees UAVs as organic air assets necessary to perform their roles and functions. Operational problems, such as adequate and direct UAV support to ground forces and air space management, fuel the two positions. Agreements in 2008 called for more UAV missions to be flown by the Air Force in support of ground forces alleviated these underlying operational issues. Osborn, Kris and Michael Hoffman, "Air Force, Army Near Agreement on UAV Pact," *Air Force Times*, September 30, 2008.

† The Goldwater-Nichols Act calls for the CJCS to submit recommendations on roles and functions, though, as noted previously, such has only occurred in 1989, 1993, 1997, and 2009.

needed DoD reforms or to simply update the Directive to reflect changes that have already occurred. The Department is currently undertaking an effort to revise the Directive to incorporate internal changes that have taken place since the last substantial revision of the document.

Proposed Revisions to DoDD 5100.1 (2010)

Although DoDD 5100.1 was certified as current in November 2003, in reality, no major changes to the Directive have taken place in over twenty years. During this time significant events have placed new demands on the U.S. Armed Forces and, as a result, their roles and missions to meet the nation's security challenges have been altered. New functions such as cyber warfare, and renewed interest in ancient but neglected ones such as counterinsurgency, now shape the Department of Defense and its major components. Similarly, antiterrorism, building partnership capacity, and critical infrastructure protection receive increased focus and significantly change how the Department of Defense contributes to whole of government efforts. In spite of these changes, DoDD 5100.1 has not kept pace.

An initiative is currently underway to revise DoDD 5100.1 to reflect the current Department of Defense.‡ This work started with three separate efforts, only the first of which is truly complete as the second two are being repeated. First, the QRM produced an input for revising DoDD 5100.1, focusing on the Military Department sections, which the CJCS then provided to the Secretary of Defense. Second, the Directive (including the QRM input) was modified to include additions and updates to other sections and formally coordinated throughout the Department of Defense.

In this process each OSD and DoD component is afforded the opportunity to comment on and approve the Directive. Third, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) conducted follow-on adjudication discussions to

‡ The reissued document will be called Department of Defense Directive 5100.01.

resolve areas of contention and ensure the wording conformed to law. The intent of these revision efforts is to present, for the signature of the Secretary, a DoDD 5100.01 that accurately reflects current roles, missions, and functions of the Department. As of this writing, the latest revision is nearing completion and will be presented to the Secretary of Defense for his consideration.

The proposed DoDD 5100.01 includes sections on several “major components” of the Department that have not been included in previous iterations of this document. For example, while the functions of the OSD have not been detailed in DoDD 5100.1 before, the

first substantive enclosure of the proposed Directive is now devoted to OSD and has several pages outlining its role within the Department. Similarly, while the Inspector General (IG) had previously only been defined in a sentence or two, it now enjoys its own enclosure. Additionally, components that had previously not been mentioned in the Directive are now included. These, for example, include USSOCOM, which now has its functions described over three pages within the section dedicated to Common Combatant Command Functions, and the National Guard Bureau, which is described as a joint activity of the Department of Defense.

Close Air Support Since the Cold War

Since the Cold War, some senior leaders have advocated transfer of the Air Force CAS mission to the Army, but this would represent a departure from longstanding military roles the Army is not in favor of because it would siphon funding from other priorities. Innovations and issues in CAS – particularly the advent of UAVs – during operations in OIF and OEF have rekindled the debate over CAS.

According to a 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO) report, inadequate coordination of training and planning persists, as do equipment issues.¹¹⁴ The Navy and Marines have, in large part, provided their own CAS. While the Navy has expanded its CAS to the Army during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Air Force remains the primary CAS provider to the Army.

Two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 1994-1995 Congressional Commission on Roles and Missions made recommendations to solve the CAS problem. Following passage of Goldwater-Nichols, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Crowe, in his recommendations on roles and functions, asserted that, by classifying Army helicopters as CAS platforms, there was adequate CAS capacity among the four Services.¹¹⁵ Both the Army and the Air Force dissented, stating that attack helicopters lacked characteristics (speed, lethality, and flexibility) vital for CAS.¹¹⁶ The next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, submitted a reversal of Crowe’s position on CAS just two months after Crowe’s submission.¹¹⁷

Later in his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell recommended that Air Force CAS be realigned under the Army. The Congressional Commission on Roles and Missions studied CAS (as well as other issue areas) and recommended in its 1995 report that CAS and related functions continue to be performed by the Military Services as already assigned and that joint CAS training be increased. The Commission further noted that realignment would not lead to any loss of CAS capability, nor would it realize significant cost savings. Critics of the Commission’s recommendations argued that the professed solution maintained the status quo across the Military Services, and that it simply allowed a continuation of the longstanding, inter-Service clash over CAS.¹¹⁸

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have rekindled the debate over CAS. Despite a number of platforms new to CAS, including UAVs, B-52s, and B-1Bs armed with new bombs and sensors, there are still reports of insufficient or ineffective CAS. Problems include inadequate

response time, friendly fire, and collateral civilian casualties due in part to the large number of deployed ground forces, the nature of counterinsurgency operations, and longstanding inter-Service integration issues. Reports following the failure at Tora Bora (where Osama bin Laden escaped capture) and other incidents highlighted both the insufficiency of current CAS given deployed force levels and lack of integration between ground forces and CAS providers in planning, training, and execution.¹¹⁹

Incidents of friendly fire and civilian casualties have led ground commanders to opt out of CAS except where air controllers are embedded in ground units or where land forces exercise direct control of CAS.¹²⁰ Currently, the Air Force and Marines are exploring development of new CAS platforms to replace existing systems including the AC-130. UAVs are used across the Military Services and demonstrate an effective, integrated, and cheap CAS capability. UAVs could make the transfer of the CAS mission to the Army palatable in resourcing terms, although this scenario would represent a further encroachment on the Air Force's air role.

The overall structure of the proposed DoDD 5100.01 is also noticeably different. Much of the introductory language has changed, and the section outlining “Organizational Relationships in the Department of Defense” is significantly expanded. While previous Directives had cited up to six “references” from which much of the Directive language was derived, the current draft lists over 50. Moreover, while the Directive previously included a list of Defense Agencies at the end of the document, the draft DoDD 5100.01 details their general functions and those of DoD Field Activities.

Another notable proposed change to the Directive is in its language. Previous revisions generally kept most of the wording of previous iterations, adding contemporary references or clauses as needed. The proposed draft, however, has new wording, most conspicuously within the Military Service sections. Most of the Directive's current language is taken from law, whereas much of the proposed new language is not. The proposed wording reflects inputs from Military Services via the QRM process to reflect the updated technology, capabilities, and realities of cyberspace,* homeland defense, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and

counterinsurgency. Clearly these areas have taken on greater prominence since the issuance of the last iteration in 2002 and merit mention in DoDD 5100.01. Additionally, inputs from OSD have sought to standardize the structure of Military Department Sections as possible, consolidate common functions into the appropriate section of the Directive, and incorporate or revert to enduring language (rather than language of the day; e.g. Global War on Terror (GWOT)).

Judging from the long history of DoDD 5100.1, it is unclear whether the draft DoDD 5100.01, currently in final staffing, will be signed and become the latest addition of the “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.” It is apparent, that changes are needed as much has changed in the functions and responsibilities of the Department since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Summary and Conclusion

Revisions to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 have reflected changes within the Defense establishment over time. As these changes within the Department have occurred, there has been a need to update military department roles and functions, especially as technology and warfare have evolved, inadequacies in military advice and efficiency have become evident, and as operational challenges, successes, and failures have demonstrated the need for change. Historically, major overhauls of the document have not

* According to a December 2008 White House white paper, the U.S. government is still struggling with its determination as to who should handle the cyber mission—the military under its Title 10 authorities or the Intelligence Community under its Title 50 authorities.

occurred during periods of high intensity military conflict, although changes have often occurred in their wake.

Beginning with the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 9877, continuing with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, and up to the present, major updates to DoDD 5100.1 have been made as a result of executive or legislative action.

Major revisions occurred when driven by the President or senior Defense leadership and supported by Congress. Most changes to the document have directly reflected the language of executive orders or legislation. Although James Forrestal was the only Secretary of Defense to spearhead a major reform process independently, the opportunity is there for current senior Defense leadership to affect change through and in this Directive.

The *Joint Board* Agreements of 1927 and 1935, predecessors to DoDD 5100.1, demonstrated that in the absence of binding legal authority and a unified chain of command, a pact of mutual agreement could be easily ignored. As a result, the first iteration of the Directive mirrors the language of the Key West and Newport Agreements, consented to by the Military Departments and later codified by Executive Order 9877, and the National Security Act of 1947 (together with its 1949 amendments).

Changes in roles, missions, and functions as described in DoDD 5100.1 have followed a pattern of events. These include operational or other military disappointments that have demonstrated the need for reform or unveiled military ineffectiveness (often drawing public scrutiny); budget constraints or inefficiency; the significant advancement in technology with military applications; and significant progress in Military Service/ Department lessons learned, demonstrating the need for new military functions or commands. Additionally, while changes have often been suggested during the course of high intensity military conflict, Congress has refrained from carrying out reform efforts until combat operations have ended. This was the case with the National Security Act and Key West Agreement following World War II

and the Defense Reorganization Act after the Korean War. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also took place during peacetime following lesser, but nonetheless dramatic military action. Major changes affecting the Department and DoDD 5100.1 have not occurred since this time deep in the Cold War.

While Directive 5100.1 is a Defense Department document, it has historically largely reflected the will of the Commander-in-Chief and Congress. No major overhaul of the document has ever taken place without the leadership, or at least approval of, the President. The National Security Act of 1947 passed largely because President Truman insisted on compromise between the Services and then pushed his reforms through Congress. President Eisenhower was the driving force behind the 1958 Defense Reorganization and he fought hard with Congress to see his plan enacted. Efforts leading to the Goldwater-Nichols Act languished until President Reagan accepted the argument for reform.

Secretaries of Defense and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also instigated reform as evidenced by Secretary Forrestal with the Key West Agreement or Generals Jones and Meyer with the 1986 reorganization. The involvement and support of key legislative leadership is also required as key reforms have lived or died with Congress. The trend is clear - in order for a major defense overhaul to take place, senior Defense leaders must play an active role in the issue and drive reforms.

As an internal and general public resource, future revisions of DoDD 5100.1 should consider how the Directive is used within and outside of the Department of Defense. The Directive continues to be taught in military staff colleges, employed in training, cited in Joint and Service-specific publications, and used as the basis for the development of doctrine and procedures within the Department of Defense. Outside the Department of Defense, the Directive plays a key role in explaining to audiences in all three branches of government, their staffs, various government agencies, and private companies, what the Department of Defense and its major components do.

In light of the declining percentage of senior leaders and elected officials that have military experience, DoDD 5100.1 may become an increasingly important tool in helping decision-makers navigate the complexities of the organization and better understand the responsibilities and capabilities of its major components. Additionally, as the Department works closely with other Executive Departments and Agencies and external actors, this Directive may serve a coordinating and descriptive role, providing government and non-governmental partners with information about the Department and the responsibilities of each of its major components. DoDD 5100.1 is and will increasingly be relevant to internal and external audiences of the Department of Defense.

More frequent updates to, or reviews of the document would ensure that DoDD 5100.01 is a current description of DoD major component roles and functions. Internal review and updating might also stem external involvement in the crafting of DoD Directives. However, these initiatives require greater attention from and longer term engagement by Defense leaders at the highest levels to ensure successful revision and acceptance throughout the Department.

The difficulty in doing so is evident in that major revisions to DoDD 5100.1 have been rare throughout its history - and have often reflected the interests of those outside the Department. As a 1993 Congressional Research Service Report entitled, "Roles and Functions of U.S. Combat Forces," concluded (*emphasis added*):

Paper reforms... produce best results only if common practices conform. As it stands, U.S. armed Services, past and present, have always felt free to acquire personnel, weapons, equipment, and supplies regardless of roles and functions.* *Title 10 and DoD*

*Directive 5100.1 accordingly will remain less useful than architects intend until congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense use both documents more consistently than their predecessors did to help shape the U.S. military establishment.*¹²¹

While DoDD 5100.1 has historically reflected far-reaching reform and evolutionary changes after they have taken place, the Secretary of Defense, as suggested here, could use DoDD 5100.1 in a more directive fashion to lead change in roles, missions, and functions from within.

* While this criticism is accurate, some acquisition and employment peripherally outside prescribed roles and functions – just as with overlaps – may be prudent. “The military planner sees this as a prudent hedge and a provision of complementary capabilities to defeat complementary threats; outside observers probably see it as typical Pentagon waste” or, in this case, perhaps disregard for direction. Kuehl and Miller, p. 104.

Appendix A: Modifications to Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (DoDD 5100.1)

DoDD 5100.1 was first issued in 1954 with changes to it in 1957, 1958, 1966, 1969, 1977, 1980, 1985, 1986, 1987 (twice), and 2002. However, not all iterations included substantive modifications. The following summarizes changes made, leadership at the time of revision, and influences or linkages driving the changes to DoDD 5100.1, as well as precursors to the directive.

Precursors to DoDD 5100.1

April 1927: The “Joint Action of the Army and the Navy” assembled all joint policies, agreements, and instructions between the War and Navy Departments and demarcated basic functions of the Navy, Army, and Marines. Signed by: SecWar Davis and SecNav Wilbur.

July 1942: With the creation of the Executive Office of the President, authorized by the Reorganization Act of 1939, President Roosevelt brought Admiral Leahy out of retirement to become Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, working as an intermediary between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. “Leahy’s tenure established the heritage of independent advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff) while retaining civilian control of the U.S. military establishment.”*

July 1947: The National Security Act of 1947 created the Secretary of Defense (SD) and National Military Establishment (NME), institutionalized the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Joint Chiefs of Staff), and codified their basic purposes and relationship. Public Law 80-253. On the same day, President Truman issued Executive Order 9877 providing more detail to military functions. However, it also created discrepancies with the National Security Act causing contention between the military departments. Signed by: President Truman.

April 1948: (SD: Forrestal/ USD: vacant) This precursor to DoDD 5100.1 known as the Key West Agreement listed the common functions of the Armed Forces, the functions of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the individual functions of the Services. “Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal gathered the Service Chiefs at Key West, Fla. in an attempt to settle the contentious issue of roles and missions,” focused mainly on questions about airpower.* Signed by: SD Forrestal.

August 1948: (SD: Forrestal/ USD: vacant) The Newport Agreement resulted from conflict between the Military Departments over budgetary constraints, ambiguity of the term “primary mission,” and control and direction of atomic operations. Conferees clarified the term “primary mission” and agreed that the Air Force would take on the atomic strategic mission, but allowed all Military Departments to continue other atomic development and employment. Signed by: SATSD Ohly.

August 1949: Amendments to the National Security Act renamed the “National Military Establishment” the “Department of Defense” and the “Under Secretary of Defense” (USD) the “Deputy Secretary of Defense” (DSD). It also created the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), three Assistant Secretaries of Defense (ASD), and the DoD comptroller. Amendments also removed the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expanded the Joint Staff, and added Title IV providing uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures. Public Law 81-216.

October 1953: (SD: Wilson/ DSD: Kyes) This precursor to DoDD 5100.1 entitled, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” maintains the body of the Key West Agreement but reflects National Security Act language changes quoted in the introduction. Signed by: SD Wilson.

Iterations of DoDD 5100.1

March 1954: (SD: Wilson/ DSD: Kyes) In this first iteration of DoDD 5100.1, the leadership of the Secretary of Defense became more clearly established. President Eisenhower’s military experience led him to advocate for stronger civilian control over the military. Signed by: Administrative Secretary Rouche.

November 1957: (SD: McElroy/ DSD: Quarles) Minor changes are made to just the first page of the document. Signed by: Administrative Secretary Rouche.

December 1958: (SD: McElroy/ DSD: Quarles) This iteration debuted the “Office of the Secretary of Defense” and the Unified Command Plan (UCP) in DoDD 5100.1. It also empowered unified commanders by transferring operational missions from the Services to the Unified and Specific Commands on a geographical and functional basis. It has been noted, “Eisenhower’s subsequent Defense reorganization proposals in 1958 further strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the role of the Chairman. Eisenhower advocated vesting the Secretary of Defense, rather than the Services, with the sole legal responsibility for combat operations, while empowering the CJCS, supported by an enlarged Joint Staff, to assist the Secretary of Defense in controlling the new unified commands. The resulting legislation nearly doubled the size of the Joint Staff to 400 officers.”* Eisenhower’s time as CJCS led him to advocate for these changes. Signed by: SD McElroy.

June 1966: (SD: McNamara/ DSD: Vance) A section is added to this iteration listing Defense Agencies and their chartering directives. It also includes two additions increasing Joint Chiefs of Staff role in logistical planning and military guidance with respect to Defense Agencies. Signed by: SD McNamara.

June 1969: (SD: Laird/ DSD: Packard) Language was added to the directive that specifies Joint Chiefs of Staff and military department functions for preparing joint logistic plans and assigning logistic responsibilities. Signed by: Administrative Secretary Roche.

March 1977: (SD: Brown/ DSD: Duncan) Minor; on page 13 subsection VI.6. changed (DSA) to (DIA) and changed “August 1, 1961” to “December 16, 1976.” Signed by: Director, Correspondence and Directives Roche.

January 1980: (SD: Brown/ DSD: Carlucci and Claytor) As per Public Law 95-485 (1978), the Marine Corps Commandant becomes a full and equal member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under Secretaries appear in this iteration for the first time. Signed by: DSD Claytor.

May 1985: (SD: Weinberger/ DSD: Taft) The Coast Guard appears in the document for the first time. During times of war, the Coast Guard functions as a Military Service under the Department of the Navy as per 14 U.S.C. sections 2, 3, and 145. This document also enumerates the Coast Guard’s specific functions in both peace and war time. Signed by: DSD Taft.

January 1986: (SD: Weinberger/ DSD: Taft) Space operations are introduced to military department functions and are shared as collateral functions among the Services. Signed by: DSD Taft.


April 1987: (SD: Weinberger/ DSD: Taft) As a result of Goldwater-Nichols, many significant changes took place. These include emphasis on jointness between the Services, the empowerment of the CJCS (became the principal military advisor), and the empowerment of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) (ex. COCOM chain of command bypasses the Services). This is the first time space functions are specifically enumerated within each Service. Additionally, this iteration includes the first appearance of missile defense, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and special operations. The DoD function to “[s]afeguard the internal security of the United States” is eliminated from the document. Signed by: DSD Taft.

September 1987: (SD: Weinberger/ DSD: Taft) The Inspector General (IG), DoD, receives its own paragraph in the organizational relationships section. Signed by: DSD Taft.

August 2002: (SD: Rumsfeld/ DSD Wolfowitz) The Air Force takes on space as a primary, rather than collateral, function. SD Rumsfeld served on the U.S. Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization thus prompting him to seek better organization for DoD space operations. Signed by: DSD Wolfowitz.

Evolution of Department of Defense Directive 5100.1

DoDD 5100.1 Timeline



Endnotes

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